时间：2023年12月12日（周二）下午15:30分。
地点：电竞博彩
214室
摘要：
In 2016, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced the "double random" inspection system, which employs a random sampling mechanism to restrict the CSRC's discretion in selecting inspection targets and inspectors. This study takes advantage of this unique context and employs a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to examine the impact of bureaucratic discretion on auditor choice. The results show that the implementation of the "double random" inspection system increases firms' inclination to choose high-quality auditors, and this effect is more pronounced among firms with lower quality pre-audited financial reports, located in regions with higher penalties risk, and with lower equity restriction ratio. Further analyses reveals that the “double random” inspection system (1) increases the probability of firms switching from a small audit firm to a large one, while reduces the probability of firms switching from a large audit firm to a small one, (2) enhances auditor independence, and (3) improves firms’ earnings quality. Our findings suggest that restrictions on bureaucratic discretion forcing firms to rely more on high-quality auditors to mitigate regulatory risks by restraining them from using other tactics to circumvent regulation.
报告人简介：龚启辉，浙江大学管理学院副教授，研究方向主要是审计市场治理、数字化与劳动力市场，研究成果发表在《经济研究》、《会计研究》、TAR、JAPP、ABR等经济学和会计学领域权威学术期刊。主持和参与多项国家自然科学基金和国家社会科学基金项目，兼任《经济研究》和ABR等期刊审稿人。
